Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations

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Recent research demonstrates that larger and better-equipped United Nations peacekeeping missions more effectively ensure peace and security. This raises an important question: what explains the willingness of member-states to contribute the substantial numbers of troops needed to achieve peacekeeping goals? We argue that narrow member-state security interests offer an important explanation. We find that states embroiled in an ongoing rivalry with another state in the international system contribute more personnel to ongoing missions. Additionally, we find that regimes concerned about coup attempts increase deployments to peacekeeping operations. In a more general sense, this article suggests that the provision of security by peacekeeping operations to their host states is partially dependent upon higher levels of insecurity elsewhere in the international system.

By late 2000, the civil war in Sierra Leone finally began its turn toward peace. The war had been persistent and brutal, spanning nearly the previous decade and characterized by wanton atrocities wrought by multiple competing factions. The United Nations (UN) observer mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which had been deployed since late 1998, had proven itself impotent for over a year. It was incapable of restraining conflict on the battlefield or preventing the gratuitous abuse of civilians by combatants. Recognizing the need for a more fully constituted mission in order to stabilize the country, Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an expanded peacekeeping operation: “In view of the volatility of the security situation in Sierra Leone...the United Nations force should be large and capable” (United Nations 1999). The resulting United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peaked at over 17,000 soldiers and was larger than any previously deployed UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Africa. Soon thereafter, hostilities in Sierra Leone gave way to peace; the expanded UN troop commitment proved an integral element of this transformation (Kreps 2010).

But how did the UN acquire these large numbers of soldiers? Whenever the UN significantly expands its peacekeeping deployments, it does so under the direction of the Secretary General and with the agreement of the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, none of this matters if UN member-states do not voluntarily commit soldiers to peacekeeping missions. In the case of UNAMSIL, several countries bore the brunt of the troop burden. Pakistan and Nigeria alone supplied approximately 45 percent of the total personnel committed as UNAMSIL approached full deployment (UNAMSIL Facts and Figures 2005).

Why do member-states make such substantial contributions of military personnel? The answer matters a great deal. If sizeable PKO troop deployments are important to the pursuit of peace in war-torn countries, and recent research suggests that larger PKOs are more likely to succeed, then it is imperative that we understand what motivates UN member-states to deploy their own soldiers as peacekeepers. Indeed, the UN employs peacekeeping as a means to confront challenges to intra- and interstate security, protect civilians, and promote human rights. But, as the UNAMSIL example makes clear, many of the most common and substantial contributors to PKOs lack track records that suggest a firm commitment to these goals. What then, might motivate such governments to supply soldiers to the UN—forces that would otherwise be available to meet their own security challenges? In this article, we argue that they do so because they receive security benefits that outweigh the costs of diverting their soldiers to PKOs.

A reality of post-Cold War UN peacekeeping is that many of the most robust troop contributors to PKOs face distinct security challenges of their own. As powerful, politically stable Western countries have scaled back their commitments, they have passed the burden of peacekeeping to less secure states (Lebovic 2010). Many of these

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1Indeed, Nigeria and Pakistan have supplied large numbers of personnel to such challenging conflicts as those in Sudan, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Troop contributions to UNAMSIL also came from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zambia.
states face a well-known dilemma. They must employ substantial militaries to guard against threats to their national security. But, at the same time, those forces may overthrow their own governments. Nigeria and Pakistan are emblematic of this dilemma. Both have faced interstate challenges to their security. Both have had a long history of military coups.

In this article, we argue that this dilemma helps explain contributions to PKOs. Such contributions help ameliorate the twin challenges of (1) funding and maintaining a capable and ready military when faced with a threat to national security and (2) limiting the ability of the military to jeopardize civilian control of government. We address these challenges in the context of the guns-versus-butter trade-off that all member-states face. On the one hand, troops gain the experience, training, and professionalization during PKO deployments that member-states often lack the resources to provide on their own. As such, PKO contributions allow states to outsource, in part, the funding of their own military readiness. They therefore alleviate the guns-versus-butter trade-off that hamstrings weaker, less-developed states. On the other hand, PKO deployments attenuate the risk of coups by allowing member-states to station their troops abroad. This helps shield civilian control of domestic politics from military intervention.

In the following pages, we briefly review the literature on peacekeeping effectiveness, emphasizing the importance of sufficiently supplying operations with the necessary personnel and the means by which the UN achieves this. We then elaborate on our central claims. We test our arguments with a global data set of UN member-state contributions to peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. We conclude that there is a paradox in peacekeeping. That is, unstable states contribute more peacekeeping troops, helping create stability elsewhere.

**Peacekeeping Effectiveness and Member-State Contributions**

Much of the literature on UN peacekeeping assesses the effectiveness of missions in producing peaceful outcomes in war-ravaged states. Scholars pay less attention to what motivates states to contribute to these missions. This focus makes sense. After all, given an annual budget of over $7.8 billion and nearly 105,000 peacekeeping personnel deployed around the world to sixteen ongoing peacekeeping missions (United Nations 2016), the efficacy of such efforts takes on pressing importance.

**Does Peacekeeping Yield Peace?**

Peacekeeping research has come to somewhat differing conclusions on the effectiveness of UN operations. Case studies and early quantitative work reported that the UN has a mixed record in achieving and maintaining peace in PKO host states. Qualitative analyses pointed to the shortcomings of individual missions that became defined by their failures (Jett 1999; Jones 1999, 2001). Quantitative studies indicated the UN was largely incapable of preventing conflict recurrence (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996), ceasing ongoing conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), and pursuing democratic reforms in postconflict environments (Gurses and Mason 2008).

In contrast, several similar works highlighted the positive returns of peacekeeping. Research shows PKOs can improve the prospects of post-civil war peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008), monitor ceasefires and avoid conflict recidivism (Fortna 2004, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), promote democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Pickering and Peceny 2006), and protect civilians.\(^2\)

Importantly, many studies often did not account for how the UN chose the conflict states to which it deployed peace operations. This is important as scholars indicate that the UN tends to select rather difficult conflict cases (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Scholars have thus come to recognize that success in peacekeeping is hard to achieve because the UN sends its PKOs to challenging environments (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008).

In addition, recent work further indicates that peacekeeping operations vary in their ability to produce and protect peace. In particular, the size and quality of personnel contributions are critical elements of peacekeeping success in protecting civilians (Evans 2008; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016), reducing or ending conflict between the combatants (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), securing peace and initiating greater cooperation between the conflict factions (Kreps 2010; Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016), and containing conflict from infecting neighbor states (Beardsley 2011). Additionally, case studies indicate how the paucity of peacekeeping resources (including personnel commitments) deployed to UN missions produces negative outcomes in terms of achieving operation goals (Bratt 1996; Feil 1998; Findlay 2002). Thus, to explain peacekeeping effectiveness, the literature is coming to greater consensus on the importance of intervention conditions and, crucially, the effort put forth by the UN. When the UN puts greater resources into its peacekeeping endeavors, it is more effective.

It is thus important that we understand how the UN supplies its missions with the necessary resources. The UN’s ability to supply peacekeepers to new and ongoing missions depends on the voluntary willingness of its member-states to provide them. Since few works assess member-state motivations to supply troops, we have an insufficient understanding of how UN PKOs meet the number of troops necessary for achieving peace.\(^3\)

**Motivating Member-State Contributions**

The original conception of the UN’s collective security environment was to deter international conflict through the threat of punishing aggressors with the collective capabilities of the international community. Providing such collective security implied the active involvement of powerful states. In other words, states with global power projection capabilities would need to collaborate to deter aggression. However, over the course of the postwar period, peace operations have rarely addressed interstate war and have not confronted great powers. Instead, UN missions have largely been deployed to developing countries suffering from intrastate conflicts.

Given the voluntary nature of peacekeeping personnel commitments, motivating member-states to supply the UNSC-mandated troops to outfit missions is a critical element of the peacekeeping process. This is especially

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\(^3\)For notable exceptions, see Bove and Elia (2011), Gabulloev et al. (2015), Perkins and Neumayer (2008), and Lebovic (2004, 2010).
the case when it comes to providing personnel to intra-state conflicts that do not necessarily hold the potential to destabilize the international system. Scholars point to a number of such motivations. Although some scholars argue that states make choices about contributing troops on a case-by-case basis (Bellamy and Williams 2013), we believe it is possible to identify general factors that make contributing more or less attractive. Some evidence suggests that states with political cultures closely aligned with the UN’s institutional norms of peace, stability, and human rights contribute more commonly to peacekeeping efforts (Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Andersson 2002). However, much of the literature indicates that states are often motivated by narrower self-interests such as maintaining the international political status quo (Neack 1995), protecting former colonies or trade partners (Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1999), maintaining alliance and security ties (Lebovic 2004), stemming refugee flows (Uzonyi 2015), and stabilizing proximate PKO host states (Perkins and Neumayer 2008).

In this sense, state-centric interests motivate personnel contributions. Research has pointed to the continued importance of powerful countries (like the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) funding missions and providing the equipment and technological wherewithal necessary for PKO deployments. Yet, this belies a transition in the supply of peacekeeping personnel. Bobrow and Boyer (1997) point to increasing diversity of contributor countries starting in the early post-Cold War period. This is likely the product of powerful Western nations scaling back their contributions (Shearer 1998; Bellamy and Williams 2013). Less developed, weaker, and less secure countries have entered the void that the West has left (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009; Lebovic 2010). For instance, Victor (2010) shows that sub-Saharan African states that contributed to regional peacekeeping efforts were both poorer and had lower state legitimacy. Bove and Elia (2011) examine troop contributions between 1999 and 2009 and find that economic incentives motivate states to contribute troops to UN PKOs. However, as indicated in Figure 1, not all less capable states contribute equally. Indeed, deploying one’s own troops comes with significant costs as contributed troops cannot carry out service duties in their home countries while committed abroad.5 We suggest that those countries that are motivated to contribute troops, irrespective of the location to which those troops are deployed, are countries that are likely to procure military and security benefits that counterbalance and outweigh the costs of PKO deployment. In other words, those states that substantially contribute to UN missions are those that face difficult military challenges of their own. They thus aim to benefit from the security dividends that peacekeeping operations offer.

In this regard, contributing peacekeeping troops benefits particular types of states, which we associate with the transition away from powerful states to lesser capable countries. Weak, underdeveloped member-states obtain different military/security dividends from making troop contributions relative to the UN’s powerful members. Unlike the Realist conception of formal militaries as the tool of a state’s international power projection, among less politically stable states militaries are more often both the primary guarantor of security via national defense while also posing the primary threat to regime stability via the risk of a coup. Thus, for troop contributions from non-Western countries to pay military/security dividends that counterbalance and outweigh the costs of such deployments, there must be qualities of PKO troop commitments that satisfy these seemingly contradictory interests.

We maintain that there are two unique and related qualities of peacekeeping troop contributions that appeal to those member-state regimes that view their militaries as both guarantor and threat to security. First, PKO troop contributions can reduce the severity of the guns-versus-butter trade-off faced by member-states. Second, PKO contributions allow some member-states to station substantial forces abroad when this would not otherwise be possible outside of UN peace missions.

**Guns-versus-Butter or Guns-for-Guns-and-Butter**

All states face a spending trade-off in committing resources to the maintenance of their military forces (Mintz 1992; Mintz and Huang 1991). In what is often referred to as the guns-versus-butter trade-off, for every dollar spent on a case when it comes to providing personnel to intra-state conflicts that do not necessarily hold the potential to destabilize the international system. Scholars point to a number of such motivations. Although some scholars argue that states make choices about contributing troops on a case-by-case basis (Bellamy and Williams 2013), we believe it is possible to identify general factors that make contributing more or less attractive. Some evidence suggests that states with political cultures closely aligned with the UN’s institutional norms of peace, stability, and human rights contribute more commonly to peacekeeping efforts (Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Andersson 2002). However, much of the literature indicates that states are often motivated by narrower self-interests such as maintaining the international political status quo (Neack 1995), protecting former colonies or trade partners (Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1999), maintaining alliance and security ties (Lebovic 2004), stemming refugee flows (Uzonyi 2015), and stabilizing proximate PKO host states (Perkins and Neumayer 2008).

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4This is the earliest post-Cold War year for which data are available (Kathman 2013).

5For instance, states may be less likely to deploy soldiers when they might be needed to maintain domestic order, such as during times of riots and violent protests (Tago 2014).
on the military states forgo dedicating that dollar to other civil welfare purposes. During periods of interstate tranquility, states face fewer demands for security resources. However, as interstate threats rise, so do the demands for military spending at the expense of civil welfare. States thus often look to supplement the resources available to maintain military readiness. The guns-versus-butter trade-off is more severe in third world countries than it is in stable, advanced, powerful states as the national pool of resources available is often small (Diciki 2015). National security threats put great pressure on the small pool of resources available in third world countries.

The presence of an interstate rival exemplifies just such a security threat. A shared history of hostility defines rivalries between states. The presence of a rival focuses the foreign and security policy attention of states. Even though rival states are often not actively engaged in violent confrontations with one another, the presence of a rival induces states to remain prepared to fight in the event that an overt conflict between the rivals should occur (Klein et al. 2008). This poses third world, less powerful countries with the difficult task of dividing the resource pie to effectively deter or confront the rival. This likely requires spending substantial resources on defense while reducing civil spending. Rivalry conditions make expanding the budgetary pie critical in states with limited resources. Maintaining a military that is able to respond to rivals requires tactical, logistical, and weapons training, as well as field experience in multiple environments. Capably providing the resources necessary to maintain readiness in the presence of an interstate rival is especially difficult for less powerful states.

Contributing soldiers to peacekeeping missions offers a valuable opportunity in this regard. PKO troops gain vital experience in multiple conflict contexts. Peacekeeping offers access to and training with high-tech equipment and weaponry. Peacekeepers receive combat training, field experience, officer training, and professionalization (Copetas 2007; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimzu 2009; Kahn 2014). Such training is otherwise costly and limited in the deployed personnel’s home country (Axe 2010). For states with limited military resources, peacekeeping offers meaningful training and operational experience without diverting money from civil spending.

PKO involvement also offers a more straightforward means of relieving the financial pressure of funding a military as troop reimbursements add to a contributing state’s budget. While the UN’s reimbursement rate of $1,028 per soldier-month is rather low by Western standards, it is in fact substantially higher than the per-soldier rate for many countries. In fact, this reimbursement rate increases member-states’ ability to purchase and maintain military equipment to arm their national forces (Bosco 2013; Zaman and Biswas 2013). Some countries arguably choose to specialize in supplying blue helmets as a moneymaking venture (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). At the least, participation in peacekeeping deployments offers a valued opportunity for states to underwrite their own force readiness, thus helping to ameliorate the strain of the guns-versus-butter trade-off. In this sense, providing the “guns” to PKOs allows the contributors to spend more on “guns” and “butter.” The need to improve force readiness and capabilities in preparation for conflict is especially poignant for states facing an interstate rival. Bearing this in mind, we note that seven of the ten states depicted in Figure 1 have had long experiences with interstate rivals, many of which engaged in multiple rivalries simultaneously and several of which continue to the present. None of the four Nordic countries mentioned face such threats.

While rivalries require a readied and capable military, contributing troops to PKOs likely reduces a state’s ability to respond immediately to an arising security threat because troop contributions deploy to distant host states. However, the voluntary nature of troop contributions gives member-states authority over the size and timing of force withdrawal. While a substantial withdrawal may generate indirect or reputational costs, there are no formal institutional mechanisms that prohibit this. Force removal can have the PKO troops returned to their home countries in a matter of days. Thus, peacekeeping contributions enable states to deploy substantially numbers of troops abroad without substantially limiting their availability for immediate use. This is certainly relevant for interstate rivalries as there is often a great deal of time between episodes of open, armed conflict between rival states. During these dormant periods, rival states seek to maintain readied and capable militaries for the prospect of future confrontations.

Voluntary PKO troop contributions offer critical benefits that enable states to prepare for the potential reemergence of violent conflict episodes with their rival. Even if the nature and training associated with particular PKOs differ from that intended for troops destined for combat, the benefits of reimbursements, professionalization, and modernization are transferable and have significant implications. For instance, Pakistan’s UN PKO involvement has “provided vital international exposure for its military in emergency medical and engineering services, aviation, de-mining, and other essential professional techniques” (Malik 2013, 215). Peacekeeping troop contributions offer an option for satisfying these interests without relying on domestic resources that would otherwise strain the guns-versus-butter trade-off. The troop readiness benefits of peacekeeping thus encourage states that face an external threat to their national security to contribute greater numbers of troops to PKOs. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: UN member-states engaged in an ongoing interstate rivalry make greater peacekeeping troop contributions to ongoing PKOs relative to states that are not engaged in an interstate rivalry.

Pointing Guns Away From the Regime

Whereas threats from interstate rivalries engender readiness concerns that contributions to UN PKOs help to ameliorate, in less politically stable countries the primary threat to civilian control of the government often comes from the state’s own security apparatus. Military coups

\footnote{For instance, alliances can be used to augment a state’s power as formal security agreements between countries increase the pool of resources that can be used to confront a common security threat by collectivizing the military assets of the alliance members. Also, alliances reduce the severity of the guns-versus-butter trade-off by reducing the number of resources that any one alliance member must contribute to countering the external threat (Claude 1962; Kaplan 1957; Morgenthau 1973). Alliances can thereby be especially useful for developing and less powerful states with limited resources when confronting this trade-off (Diciki 2015).}

\footnote{From Figure 1, only Nepal, Bangladesh, and Uruguay did not partake in some form of interstate rivalry across the Cold War and post-Cold War periods according to Thompson (2001).}

\footnote{One notable example was Belgium’s immediate withdrawal of its 400 soldiers from Rwanda at the start of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, thus removing a central component of the UN mission’s force structure.}
d'état are swift seizures of power in which the military seeks to depose its civilian chiefs, often taking advantage of weakening civilian political control. Civilian-led governments, particularly those in unstable, developing countries without institutionalized civilian control of the military, often face a tension in civil-military relations. On the one hand, they face the pressure of developing and maintaining a military capacity that is substantial enough to confront security threats. On the other hand, governments also seek to limit the ability of the military to jeopardize civilian control through a direct seizure of power.

These cross-pressures incentivize balancing military readiness with simultaneous coup-proofing strategies. Coup-proofing strategies include providing material and financial incentives to the military for remaining subordinate to civilian leadership (Huntington 1991). Greater resources committed to the military (and, as a result, away from civil spending) should thus placate the military’s leadership, reducing the likelihood that the military would threaten civilian control over the state. On the other hand, governments also seek to limit the ability of the military to jeopardize civilian control through a direct seizure of power.

Figure 1. Top ten country contributors of UN PKO troops, 2010

Although, this belies research that links poor economic conditions and waning popular support for civilian regimes as explanations of military coups (Collier 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Huntington 2006). In other words, unacceptable political and economic conditions can open the door to coups, suggesting that the guns-versus-butter trade-off must have a balance that also satisfies the population to avoid creating a domestic threat from the military. As we described above, peacekeeping troop commitments offer an opportunity to expand the resource pie by reducing the burden on states to finance their own military training, professionalization, and field experience while also receiving per-soldier reimbursement payments from the UN. In this sense, PKO contributions ameliorate the guns-versus-butter trade-off for the threat of coups, as they do for the threat posed by rival states, because the resource pie for both civil and military spending is increased with participation in peacekeeping.

Additionally, troop contributions offer other potentially important coup-proofing benefits. Where civil-military relations are tenuous, civilian leaders often seek to create organizational obstacles within the military that reduce its ability to coordinate a coup. As a hierarchical institution, a state’s military relies upon the cohesion of its forces for carrying out many of its basic functions. Successful coups also depend upon the military leadership’s ability to coordinate, synchronize, and direct its subordinate forces toward deposing and replacing the sitting government. Coup-proofing strategies have included constructing paramilitary forces that are loyal to the regime and operate outside the formal structure of the military (First 1970). Additionally, states often separate the military into branches, which increases the difficulty of recruiting conspirators across branch divisions (Powell 2012). By fractionalizing the military, regimes can subvert the military’s organizational solidarity, in turn reducing its ability to carry out a coup (Belkin and Schofer 2003). Indeed, some of these coup-proofing strategies have been found to reduce the likelihood that armed forces will attempt to unseat civilian-led governments (Powell 2012).
As noted above, the second unique quality of deploying soldiers to UN missions is the stationing of troops abroad, an action that would not otherwise be possible for many states outside the auspices of a PKO. Deploying troops abroad as UN peacekeepers acts as a coup-proofing strategy. The aforementioned voluntary nature of troop contributions offers member-states a great deal of flexibility in determining the number of troops that they dedicate to UN peacekeeping efforts and the timing of their withdrawal. PKOs rarely reach mandated troop levels (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2015). Since demand outstrips supply, there is the opportunity for member-states to make additional contributions when the perceived threat of a coup is especially high. By deploying large numbers of troops to distant conflicts, regimes reduce the ability of their forces to coordinate a coup attempt.

Governments posed with an elevated risk of a coup are likely to see PKO troop commitments as a way to ameliorate the guns-versus-butter trade-off and keep substantial military personnel at a safe distance. For instance, Bangladesh, which has been one of the largest contributors to PKOs in recent years, has effectively reduced the army’s willingness to seize control of the government despite a volatile political environment (Murthy 2007). Peacekeeping keeps the Bangladesh army from being involved in domestic politics, allowing for the reassertion of civilian control after the period of military politicization that followed its war for independence. Similarly, coup attempts in Nigeria and Pakistan may have motivated in part the initiatives for peacekeeping contributions by these states listed as top PKO contributors in Figure 1 experienced at least one coup attempt in the post-Cold War period, and only two have avoided any coup attempts since the mid-twentieth century (Powell and Thyne 2011). By contrast, and unsurprisingly, the four Nordic countries previously mentioned have faced no such coup attempts.

One concern for using peacekeeping deployments as a coup-proofing strategy may be that peacekeepers return to their home states with better training and weapons capabilities, which could then be used to engage in a coup. As a result, it might be argued that these troops pose a greater risk in the intermediate and long term as a result of peacekeeping. However, this risk is attenuated in two ways. First, coups are swift seizures of power that are more likely to occur under unstable political and poor economic conditions. Under such conditions, successful coups have a greater likelihood of subsequently being accepted by the public. Yet these rare conditions that increase the risk of a coup are not constant over time. Thus, it is unlikely that the economic crisis or political instability that engendered a greater likelihood of a coup will still be an acute problem for the sitting regime as it was when it began cycling its soldiers to PKOs. Second, peacekeepers receive professionalization training as an explicit element of their PKO involvement. Included in this is a particular emphasis on the democratic norm of civilian control of the military, and peacekeeper training explicitly seeks to formalize these norms. As such, it is unlikely that peacekeeping deployments would backfire on a regime’s interest in coup-proofing as a result of soldiers returning more capably trained.

Recognizing that coups are more likely in the years following a failed coup attempt (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Collier 2007; Powell 2012), civilian leaders are vulnerable in the years following a recent failed coup. Civilian leaders are thus likely to expand PKO troop commitments for many years following a failed coup. However, while the supply of troops rarely meets PKO-mandated demand, there is not an infinite void to fill from year to year by any one state. Additionally, member-states often seek to deploy their soldiers in a concentrated fashion, such as sending entire battalions to a single mission. In this way, the experience and training is more uniform across a singular cohesive fighting unit than it would be if member-states spread their units across many missions. Available openings for such contributions are likely to increase with time as more missions deploy and as other member-states withdraw from existing missions. Thus, civilian leaders are likely to increase their troop contributions in the period following a failed coup attempt as the risk of a subsequent coup is high and the opportunities for greater contributions increase. As failed coup attempts become more distant, we expect a subsequent decrease in troop commitments since the risk of another coup fades. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Following failed coup attempts, UN member-states will initially increase their troop contributions to UN PKOs and later reduce their commitments over time.

In line with existing scholarship, we thus suggest that peacekeeping troop commitments are at least a partial product of the narrow self-interests of member-states. Specifically, troop contributions to UN peace missions offer a unique combination of benefits that are valuable to less stable states for which the military serves as both guarantor and threat to security. By expanding the resource pie, troop contributions help states ameliorate the guns-versus-butter trade-off and maintain a trained, readied military to address external threats while also reducing the incentives for the military to threaten civilian control. Additionally, substantial contributions of troops should also offer member-states at risk of coups the opportunity to keep its military forces at arm’s length while still maintaining the flexibility to recall the deployed troops at a moment’s notice. Considering these benefits, it is somewhat unsurprising that stable, powerful, and wealthy states are not common troop contributors, as they are not commonly resource-strapped as to need the training and experience afforded by PKO commitments, nor do they require additional forward military deployments beyond what they have already established.

Research Design

To test our hypotheses, we examine data on all member-state contributions of personnel to UN PKOs between 1992 and 2010 (Kathman 2013). In this time period, we explore the role that the security concerns of UN

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9Only India and Nepal have avoided coup attempts, whereas most of the states on this list have had long histories of multiple coup attempts during this same period.

10For example, see the UN’s own training manuals, such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008), the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2005), Civil Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (2010), and the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (2012).

11We focus on failed coup attempts because the regime’s civilian leadership remains in power following a failed attempt. Thus the coup-proofing motivations for peacekeeping contributions are likely more relevant to leaders following a failed coup than they would be for military leaders following a successful coup.
member-states play in the decision to contribute troops and the choice of how many troops to contribute to ongoing peacekeeping missions.

**Outcome Variables and Model Selection**

We are interested in explaining both state participation in PKOs and the size of their contributions. As Coleman (2013) highlights, the size of troop contributions varies greatly. Conceptualizing contributions as a single binary choice is misleading. For example, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) employed 2,295 Indian personnel, while seven states contributed only a single officer (United Nations 2014). However, we recognize that some member-states likely do not consider making contributions to UN operations or do not have the wherewithal to make commitments. Therefore, we require a modeling technique that allows us to model the linked processes of (1) deciding to/be capable of contributing troops and (2) contributing some number of troops to ongoing PKOs.

We employ a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression as it is likely that these two decision processes are separate but linked. The ZINB enables us to capture the process that leads some states to never consider contributing troops while others may have considered contributing but did not do so in the year under consideration. We might imagine that for states that do contribute personnel in some years, the observations will follow a count distribution. The observed counts, however, will have a large number of zeros due to the presence of states that never contribute personnel. Just under a third of member-states contributed troops to UN PKOs in the time period analyzed. As a result, over two-thirds of the country-year observations in our data are coded as contributing zero troops (2,370 zero observations out of 3,395 total).12 Among those member-states that do make troop contributions, the size of the annual contributions ranges from one to 10,189 troops. For the purposes of exposition, the variation in the aggregated number of all member-state contributions to peacekeeping missions globally over the past two decades is graphically depicted in Figure 2.

We thus have two dependent variables. The first measure, contribute troops, indicates that a member-state has (1) or has not (0) made a nonzero contribution of armed troops in a given year to any PKO worldwide. The second, total troops, counts the number of soldiers committed annually to each PKO. In predicting the decision to contribute, we include factors that account for a member-state’s ability to commit troops at all. We then include measures of rivalry and coup history to test our hypotheses, along with other controls to determine how these covariates affect the quantity of troops that states commit.

In accounting for a member-state’s participation in peacekeeping and the intensity of its involvement, we need to specify our empirical models with variables that explain variation in these linked decision processes. Conceptually, we rely on Most and Starr’s (1989) opportunity and willingness approach to the study of international politics. As such, we view the decision to participate in peacekeeping at all as a function of factors that influence a member-state’s opportunity to contribute peacekeeping troops (the inflation equation). Some states may simply have an extremely low likelihood of participating at all via troop deployment. This may be the product of having no opportunity to do so or, more likely, the product of a policy orientation or other factors that limit their opportunity or reduce their likelihood of preferring any participation. In either case, we conceptualize this as limits on the opportunity to commit peacekeeping troops. Deciding how many troops to commit is then conceptualized as the willingness of member-states to contribute (the count equation), which will be influenced by various additional factors. Below, we introduce explanatory variables for member-states’ opportunity and willingness to make troop contributions to UN PKOs.

**Explanatory Variables: Opportunity to Contribute Troops**

To account for the opportunity to participate, we employ a variety of measures. First, using data from Gleditsch (2002), we account for the natural log of GDP/capita to control for the country’s likelihood of being a member of the more common pool of peacekeeping participants. As noted by Lebovic (2010), there has been a marked change in the type of peacekeeping contributor states since the end of the Cold War as PKOs have recently relied more heavily upon less developed, non-Western, less powerful states. While GDP per capita is admittedly a rough proxy for this delineation of member-states, we employ it as a more general control for the common contributors to post-Cold War peacekeeping (Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Bove and Elia 2011; Uzonyi 2013).

Second, we include several variables to account for systemic opportunities to contribute personnel. There has been a seeming systemic cycle in the overall pattern of peacekeeping personnel commitments in the post-Cold War period. Figure 2 indicates that global PKO troop levels have variously expanded and contracted over time. We thus include linear, squared, and cubed terms for time (year, year$^2$, year$^3$) that count the years from 1992 to 2010, as there may have been more or less opportunity for member-states to contribute to PKOs over this period (Bove and Elia 2011; Uzonyi 2015). Additionally, we include total UN missions, which counts the number of active UN operations deployed worldwide, reflecting existing opportunities for member-states to make troop contributions (Bove and Elia 2011; Kathman 2013). We also control for any potential variations across geographic regions with dummy variables for the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East/ North Africa, and Asia, as the ability to contribute may vary according to regional characteristics that otherwise go unaccounted for in our models.

Third, we include a practical measure, PKO host, which is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a UN member-state is currently hosting a PKO (Kathman 2013). We surmise that a state currently hosting its own mission is unlikely or unable to contribute troops to ongoing missions elsewhere in the world. In a similar fashion, we

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12 The ZINB model has the additional benefit of accounting for contagion in our observation of event counts. As described by King (1989, 768), “Contagion occurs when the expected number of events at one time is dependent on the realized number of events at some previous time.… Since with event count data we only observe the total number of events at the end of the period, contagion, like heterogeneity, is an unobserved, within observation process.” In the research conducted here, contagion refers to the idea that the occurrence of a committed peacekeeping soldier is positively correlated with the occurrence of other committed peacekeeping soldiers by the same contributor state, which are observed as annual values for each member-state in our data. According to King (1989, 769), “A negative binomial maximum likelihood estimation yields consistent and fully efficient parameter estimates in the case of overdispersion or contagion due to heterogeneity.” This, teamed with the prevalence of zeros in our data, makes the ZINB an appropriate model choice.
include civil war, which is a dichotomous variable that accounts for the presence of a major ongoing civil conflict in each UN member-state, as coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset using the 1,000-battle deaths threshold for inclusion (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We suspect that states experiencing an active civil war will be less capable of providing troops as the troops are likely needed in confronting their own domestic instability.

Fourth, we include two measures of each member-state’s regime characteristics. We suspect that relative to autocratic states democracies may have greater humanitarian interests in foreign conflicts that motivate PKO involvement (Perkins and Neumayer 2008, Andersson 2002; Lebovic 2004; Uzonyi 2015). Autocracy and democracy are dichotomized measures of each member-state’s regime type using Polity IV scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). Values above 6 are coded as democracies. Values below –6 are coded as autocracies. Finally, we include a lagged dependent variable to reflect whether or not a member-state contributed any troops to any peacekeeping missions in the previous year.

**Explanatory Variables: Willingness to Contribute Troops**

In accounting for a member-state’s willingness to deploy various numbers of troops, we include independent variables to test our two hypotheses on the security motivations of member-states to contribute to peacekeeping missions. To test our first hypothesis, we code an independent variable that accounts for whether or not a UN member-state is party to an ongoing interstate rivalry with another state in the international system. Rivalry is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the rivalry is ongoing in a given year (Thompson 2001).

Our second hypothesis expects a curvilinear relationship across time starting from the point at which a member-state experiences a failed coup. Years since failed coup counts the number of years since each member-state experienced a failed military coup as defined and coded by Powell and Thyne (2011). These data span the entire post-WWII period. While our data only cover the post-Cold War period, the values coded for years since failed coup in our temporal domain are reflective of the entire post-WWII period. To test for the hypothesized curvilinear effect, we include a squared term for this variable. We expect these variables to reveal an initial positive followed by a negative effect over time.

We also include control variables to account for additional explanations of member-state willingness to contribute troops to ongoing missions. Several of these variables are also present in the inflation stage. We account for the presence of a civil war, the autocratic and democratic nature of the regime, and the total number of UN PKOs deployed worldwide. These variables are coded identically to the way they are described above. While these variables are expected to affect the likelihood that a potential contributor state will not participate at all in peacekeeping, should states choose to participate, these variables are also likely to affect the magnitude of their contributions.

Specifically, we expect that if states are able to contribute some number of troops to peace operations, the presence of a serious civil conflict in the member-state should decrease the size of its contribution. We also expect autocracies to contribute smaller numbers of troops, whereas democracies should make larger commitments. Next, we expect that as the number of active UN missions increases, so too should the number of troops that member-
states contribute on average. Finally, we include a lagged dependent variable measuring the number of troops that each member-state contributed to PKOs in the previous year because successive troop contributions from the same member-state are at least partially dependent on previous contributions. To further account for autocorrelation, we run our analyses with robust standard errors clustered on each potential contributor country.

Results and Discussion

The results from the ZINB regression models of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are presented in Table 1. These empirical results provide substantial support for our argument that states partake in UN peacekeeping efforts as a means of satisfying their own more narrowly defined security interests. 13 Given our primary interest in assessing the size of member-state troop contributions to ongoing UN peacekeeping missions, we first evaluate the outcome stage of our ZINB models. Model 1 serves as a bare-bones model, including only our variables of interest and lagged dependent variables. Model 2 is fully specified. We find that both models 1 and 2 perform according to our theoretical expectations, providing support for our arguments about the roles of rivalry and coup attempts as significant explanations of member-state contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts.

We first assess our hypothesis that UN member-states embroiled in a rivalry contribute a greater number of troops to UN PKOs than those states that are not involved in a rivalry. The positive and significant coefficient for rivalry indicates that states embroiled in an ongoing interstate rivalry commit greater numbers of troops. Rivalries encourage greater contributions by satisfying a rival state’s interest in providing its forces with field experience, offering training with advanced weaponry, and otherwise maintaining combat readiness in the event that cold rivalries turn hot. Our findings indicate that when holding all other variables at their mean values, a member-state that is not posed with an interstate rival will contribute approximately 116 troops in a given year to UN PKOs. Yet, when a member-state is embroiled in a rivalry, this value rises to 146 troops, a 26 percent increase in the total number of committed troops.

While this increase may not seem extremely large in absolute numbers of troops, three issues are worth noting. First, the substantive result for this variable is comparable in size to the substantive effect of the other covariates in the count stage of the model, although the effect of total UN missions is more sizeable. Second, as we stated prior to our first hypothesis, we note that the number of troops committed by any one state is often cycled at routine intervals over the course of a member-state’s involvement in a PKO. Thus, with respect to the benefits that states received from their deployments, whereas the increase in the total number of troops that results from engagement in a rivalry may not seem large, the benefits imparted by these deployments (such as training, field experience, professionalization, etc.) will apply to all troops that are cycled in and out over the course of the deployment. Thus, if a state commits to a PKO for an extended number of years and has thirty soldiers deployed, the soldiers receiving the benefits of deployment will number far in excess of thirty depending on the replacement cycle on which the member-state operates. As such, the cycling of deployments has a force multiplier effect in terms of the benefits that states are able to reap from contributing troops to UN peacekeeping. Third, with respect to the impact that this increase has on PKOs, while thirty additional soldiers might not substantially boost a mission on its own, recall that this increase in troops is for every member-state involved in a rivalry. Thus, the thirty-soldier increase has a multiplicative effect over the number of rivals present in the system.

We also find evidence for the hypothesized curvilinear effects of coup attempts on the number of troops contributed by UN member-states. As the number of years since a failed coup increases, states first increase their contributions to ongoing peacekeeping efforts. We suggest that governments make larger contributions under these conditions as a form of coup-proofing, both by acquiring resources that ameliorate the guns-versus-butter trade-off and by physically separating their troops from the domestic political processes that these troops potentially threaten. As time passes, however, and the last coup attempt becomes more distant, fears of subsequent coups subside, inducing a reduction in the number of troops contributed by these states. Figure 3 reveals this curvilinear effect. For instance, from the first year following a coup attempt to the curve’s peak, the number of troops contributed to a PKO rises substantially from approximately 78 troops to 128, increasing by approximately 64 percent. The decline thereafter is similarly notable, falling by 25 percent from its peak value to 99 soldiers.

With regard to control variables in the count stage, we find that the lagged dependent variable is significant, indicating that those states that previously contributed large numbers of troops are likely to make large contributions subsequently. In other words, the amount of previous troop commitments predicts the level of future commitments. Also significant is the total UN missions variable. However, this result is negative, indicating that states contribute less as the number of missions deployed increase. This result is somewhat perplexing, and it is mirrored in the inflation stage as a rising number of missions also increases the likelihood that more states will not contribute any troops. While a larger number of missions should logically yield greater opportunities for participation, this result may support prior findings in the literature that fewer states partake in PKOs as the number of missions has expanded over the course of the post-Cold War era (Lebovic 2010).

Neither of the regime type controls produces significant results in the count stage of the model, and the same is true of the civil war control. However, the autocracy variable produces a significant result in the first stage of our model. Our model shows a positive and significant relationship between having an autocratic government and avoiding participation in PKOs. This result matches our expectation as autocracies may not be as fully incentivized to participate by the UN’s humanitarian motivations for
Table 1. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression of contributions to UN PKOs, 1992–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Y2: total troops</th>
<th>Model 1 Y1: contribute troops</th>
<th>Model 2 Y2: total troops</th>
<th>Model 2 Y1: contribute troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>.238*</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>.226*</td>
<td>(.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since failed coup</td>
<td>.034*</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>.030*</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since failed coup²</td>
<td>−.0005*</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>−.0004*</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>−.049</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
<td>−.111</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>(205)</td>
<td>1.497**</td>
<td>(.305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>(280)</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>(.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total UN missions</td>
<td>−.109**</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>.159**</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged total troops</td>
<td>.0008**</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged contribute troops</td>
<td>−6.476**</td>
<td>(1.300)</td>
<td>−5.592**</td>
<td>(.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO host</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>(365)</td>
<td>−111</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita</td>
<td>.513</td>
<td>(342)</td>
<td>−.270</td>
<td>(.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>(334)</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>(.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>−.086**</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
<td>.003**</td>
<td>(.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>−.917</td>
<td>(1.046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>5.134**</td>
<td>(.251)</td>
<td>2.409**</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year²</td>
<td>6.98**</td>
<td>(.342)</td>
<td>−917</td>
<td>(1.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3191</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>2990</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>48.58**</td>
<td>59.89**</td>
<td>15.37**</td>
<td>13.91**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (observations)</td>
<td>0.916**</td>
<td>0.796**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (nonzero)</td>
<td>(.251)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (zero)</td>
<td>(.126)</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vuong z-test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent variables lagged one month. Asia is the comparison region. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by member-state. *p < .05, **p < .01.

14 This result also comports somewhat with scholarship that has shown that democracy is not a notable explanation of which states participate in PKOs (Uzonyi 2015).

15 Following previous research, we have suggested that less developed, less stable, weaker states have become more common contributors to UN PKOs. GDP/capita is one means by which to roughly capture this pool of states. While this variable is insignificant, this does not mean that our pool of common contributors is described inaccurately, as GDP/capita maps only indirectly onto our description. As a robustness test, we also ran our analyses with a sample limited to only those countries that we suggest are more common contributors to PKOs. We did this by removing all global powers from the sample along with wealthy states (in the top 5 percent worldwide). We thus only included those states that would ostensibly fall into the post-Cold War era types of contributor states that we reference in the manuscript as having neither great military capacity nor a high level of development, although we note that our description of this pool is not limited solely to these state types. Still, the results in terms of sign and significance for our variables of interest are consistent with those reported in Table 1.

16 Table 1 also includes tests of model fit. The likelihood ratio test shows that alpha is significantly different from zero and a zero-inflated negative binomial is more appropriate than a zero-inflated Poisson. The Vuong test suggests that the model is also a significant improvement over a standard negative binomial.
Conclusions

In recent years, powerful members of the international system have reduced their troop contributions to UN missions. In their place, less powerful, developing, and less stable nations have substantially increased their personnel deployments as the UN has greatly expanded the scope of its global peacekeeping operations. The result has been a de facto peacekeeping division of labor. Powerful nations finance PKOs while weaker nations staff them (Lebovic 2010). Given the importance of substantial troop contributions in accounting for the success of missions, we sought to explain why states make such contributions. We found that both the threat posed by the presence of an interstate rivalry and the fear of future coups constitute important predictors of troop contributions to UN operations.

These findings raise important questions about the quality and effectiveness of peacekeeping. If states contribute to satisfy narrow self-interests, then why would they provide their most effective and capable personnel? Evidence suggests that this could be worrisome (Axe 2010; Jakobsen 1996; Neack 1995). Recent allegations of peacekeeper misconduct highlight problems that might be a result of the deployment of low-quality troops (Murphy 2006; Spencer 2005). At the same time, the UN remains dependent upon states that are willing to volunteer forces for PKOs. It therefore cannot exercise a great deal of selectivity when it comes to the states and military forces that make up its peacekeepers.

Despite these problems, recent research finds that UN peacekeeping generally works. To the extent that such findings survive further scrutiny, the lower-quality peacekeepers supplied by lesser powers still enhance international security. This suggests something of a paradox. That is, the very insecurity faced by some UN states helps ensure a supply of peacekeeping forces, which in turn enhances stability elsewhere in the international system.

Given the UN’s objective of improving global peace and stability, this might strike some as a potentially troubling aspect of the peacekeeping process. Thus, the policy prescriptions related to our findings may, in one sense, prove somewhat limited. No serious policy-maker would suggest finding ways to increase insecurity in member-states in order to motivate increased contributions to peacekeeping missions! Still, one takeaway from our findings is that the UN might increase per-soldier reimbursement rates for volunteered troops. If states are motivated to supply peacekeepers by narrow self-interests—in ameliorating their struggles with the guns-versus-butter trade-off—increased reimbursement rates might encourage states with more capable, professional soldiers to contribute. Unfortunately, given the low value of the reimbursement rate, even a substantial increase will be unlikely to improve volunteerism from capable, stable countries with access to high-quality soldiers.

However, such a policy change would at least prove likely to increase the number of troops made available to PKOs as, first, more countries consider the benefit of personnel contributions to their budgetary calculations and, second, existing suppliers see value in increasing their contributions. To the extent that the PKO approach to coup-proofing does prevent the forceful overthrow of government, encouraging increased contributions from at-risk states may increase their own security. Moreover, we know that peacekeeping missions commonly struggle to meet their UNSC-mandated targets (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2015). Thus, motivating greater troop supplies would be a positive development. If the supply did outstrip the demand for peacekeepers, the UN could be more selective about which member-states it relies upon for each mission. This should, in turn, should improve the UN’s ability to match member-state contributions to the host-state contexts in which they are likely to prove most effective.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

References
