
Managing Threat, Cost, and Incentive to Kill: The Short- and Long-Term Effects of Intervention in Mass Killings

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Journal of Conflict Resolution

55(5) 735-760

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002711408006

<http://jcr.sagepub.com>



Abstract

How do third-party interventions affect the severity of mass killings? The authors theorize that episodes of mass killing are the consequence of two factors: (1) the threat perceptions of the perpetrators and (2) the cost of implementing genocidal policies relative to other alternatives. To reduce genocidal hostilities, interveners must address these factors. Doing so requires that interveners alter the genocidaire's expectation of a successful extermination policy, which in turn requires a demonstration of the third party's resolve. This cannot be achieved immediately upon intervention, and, given the perpetrator's strategic response to third-party involvement, the authors expect intervention to increase hostilities in the short term. With time, however, the authors contend that the characteristics of impartial interventions offer the greatest opportunity for reducing the violence in the long term. A statistical analysis of the 1955–2005 period supports the theoretical expectations.

Keywords

mass killing, genocide, intervention

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The recent Darfur conflict—particularly regime-backed Janjaweed militia atrocities against civilians in Darfur—provoked renewed debates regarding international military intervention as a means to protect civilians and halt or reduce mass violations of human rights. Despite a moral impetus to halt genocide and mass killing, there is little consensus in the policymaking and academic communities as to effectiveness and appropriateness of foreign intervention in domestic conflicts. Legal questions regarding issues of sovereignty aside, the critical questions that often underlie such debates surround the likely effect of the intervention. On one hand, in the aftermath of Rwanda and Bosnia several policymakers, scholars, and journalists argued forcefully for intervention as a useful tool for mitigating mass violence (Feil 1998; Barnett 2002; Power 2002; Gourevitch 1999). On the other hand, there is evidence that foreign intervention exerts little influence on violence and may exacerbate hostilities (Bloom 1999; Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Kuperman 2001). Reconciling these divergent views and ascertaining the circumstances under which interventions improve or deteriorate human security is therefore a critical first step toward constructing international responses to mass killing.

This study directly addresses the effectiveness of third-party intervention in genocides. We argue that much of the debate stems from a failure to compare the short- and long-term effects of intervention. We posit that while foreign interventions often contribute to an initial surge in genocidal violence, impartial interventions reduce the magnitude of violence over the long term. Unlike other types, impartial interventions provide means for resolving the issues that drive mass killings by raising the cost to the regime of continuing the violence without exacerbating its threat perceptions. By disaggregating interventions according to the side supported, our analysis shows that effectiveness is a function of intervention type and the third party's resolve in staying committed to the crisis. Specifically, we find that in the immediate term, intervention generally exacerbates hostilities. In the longer term, pro-government interventions continue to contribute to an escalation of violence, and there is some evidence that interventions supporting the victims have a similar effect. However, as impartial third parties remain engaged in the genocide, violence abates over time. Thus, our results suggest that if leaders are interested in increasing stability, impartial interventions are the best option. The caveat to this is that leaders must weather the initial surge in violence and commit to long-term involvement if their goal is a reduction in civilian deaths. In the following section, we elaborate on these relationships by first determining the impetus for genocidal violence as a product of the threat posed to the regime by the target and the cost of carrying out mass killing. We then examine the manner in which different intervention types affect these two components over time.

Threat, Cost, and the Incentive to Kill

Scholars have proposed a variety of explanations for regime-sponsored mass killing: opportunistic scapegoating (Staub 1989; Midlarsky 2005), psychological

explanations (Bauman 2001; Charny 1982; Waller 2002), institutional theories (Harff 2003; Rummel 1997), and strategic approaches (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004). Within these explanations we note two common features that contribute to violence. First, mass killing is the product of a perceived threat posed by the victim group to the regime's political goals. Real or imagined, the victim group acts as an impediment to the domestic agenda that the regime believes to be fundamental to its well-being. This threat must be managed to allow for the agenda's attainment. Second, the pursuit of a violent policy, as with any other policy, is contingent upon the regime's expected costs for undertaking it. The threat posed by the victims and the cost necessary for employing a mass killing policy are thus central to explanations of genocidal violence.

For instance, scapegoat theories argue that given a national catastrophe, publics look to place blame for their troubles on a segment of society. Effectively marginalizing the "threat" becomes necessary for the alleviation of national ills. Psychological pathologies are then important in the willingness to pursue violence as the resolution. State institutions affect the cost calculus of exploiting these psychoses. Where power is concentrated, regimes are inhibited by fewer costs for pursuing such policies. In a related manner, strategic accounts of mass killing posit that mass violence occurs because the victim group stands in the way of goals pursued by the regime that it considers fundamental to its well-being. The state's violence policy is therefore informed by the perceived threat posed by a dissenting element of society, and it only resorts to terror when other alternatives fail to deliver desired outcomes. Domestic instability (Harff 2003) and rising threat (Davenport 1995; Gurr 1986; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) provide the opportunity to escalate violence and repression. Moreover, the more fundamental to survival and well-being the regime sees its policy goals, the more substantial the threat posed by dissenters (Valentino 2004). For example, the Turkish regime's avoidance of defeat in World War I was seen as possible only after resolving the threat posed by Armenian calls for independence. Extermination was one available option for achieving this goal (Adalian 1997). Similarly, the Khmer Rouge's goal of collectivizing the countryside was seen as the only means by which Cambodia could defend itself from persistent threats, and mass killing was its attempt to ensure the success of collectivization (Waller 2002; Valentino 2004). Further, overlapping territorial claims by Croats, Muslims, and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a perceived zero-sum confrontation in which the survival of ethnic identities were at stake, resulting in the cleansing of desired territories.

Yet, a common misconception is that genocide perpetrators see extermination as an end in itself. In fact mass killing is a policy *tool*, not a policy *goal*. Genocide is just one option available from a catalog of alternatives. Indeed, regimes often pursue other options initially, only turning to genocide when the alternatives have proven too costly or ineffective (Valentino 2004). Even in the most violent genocides, policy options including forced deportation, segregation, integration, or political compromise are often attempted prior to implementing extermination policies.

Genocide is often the last option chosen. The Nazis, for example, sought to remove the threat posed by its Jewish population. However, the “final solution” of interning and liquidating European Jews was chosen only after attempting to quarantine the Jews and considering their forced deportation.

While threat may structure the desire for mass killing, the cost of implementing the policy shapes the regime’s response. Political constraints placed on policy makers increase the costs of mass violence, reducing the incentives to adopt this policy (Rummel 1994; Poe and Tate 1994). Additionally, if the victims can defend themselves or have the support of strong allies, the cost to the regime of carrying out the mass killing should increase. In such cases, the regime requires more resources to achieve its goals and has a lower likelihood of eliminating the threat. For instance, despite Saddam Hussein’s desire to subjugate the Kurdish threat in the north following the Persian Gulf War, the cost of pursuing this strategy was high due to American air support protecting the population. By contrast, the contemporaneous Shiite rebellion in the south was brutally repressed by Hussein’s forces in large measure due to the lack of comparable American military support (Thyne 2009).

According to this logic, the makings of a mass killing campaign are located in the overall threat the regime perceives from the targeted group coupled with the costs associated such policies. For higher levels of threat, the regime should be willing to absorb greater resistance to a mass killing policy. If the cost of carrying out the policy exceeds the level of threat posed by the target group, the regime should substitute mass killing with an alternative policy. The intervention of foreign powers into genocidal conflicts alters the balance of threat and cost and therefore changes the regime’s strategic calculation. In the following sections, we examine how the direction and duration of intervention contribute to changes in the levels of violence observed during mass killings.

International Intervention and Mass Killing

Past research suggests that militarized interventions help resolve domestic conflict by alleviating the security dilemma between armed factions (Walter 2002; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Ratner 1996). As such, interventions in mass killing scenarios may yield a similar attenuating effect (Gourevitch 1999; Power 2002). Similar to other forms of intrastate hostilities, the violence of mass killings will persist so long as the perpetrators feel threatened by the target group and believe that the eradication of that threat can be achieved at acceptable costs. Third parties have the ability to affect the regime’s assessment of both of these factors. In attempting to reduce the magnitude of mass killing, third parties must attempt to (1) reduce the perpetrator’s sense of threat and (2) increase the cost to the perpetrator for carrying out the violence.

However, the direction of the support provided by the intervener (to the victim, the perpetrator, or impartial) is likely to effect on the regime’s decision calculus regarding violence levels. Specifically, impartial interveners should, over time,

contribute to a reduction in violence by helping to alleviate the threat perceived by the regime while simultaneously escalating the cost of pursuing violence. By contrast, pro-target and pro-government interventions are likely to worsen an already dire situation. Intervener resolve is critical in this relationship, and thus the duration of the intervention has important consequences for the reduction of violence.

Short-Term Intervention Effects

Based on the logic presented above, regimes are only likely to significantly reduce violence once the threat posed by the target abates or when the cost of continuing the policy exceeds the expected value of the objective. Intervention affects this calculation, and thus the severity of violence, by augmenting the threat that the target poses to the regime's policy goals and altering the cost of mass killing in an effort to make this strategy less appealing relative to other options. In the short term, interventions, regardless of direction, are likely to produce an escalation in violence as the perpetrator perceives the entrance of foreign troops into the domestic conflict as an additional threat to the realization of its goals that does not necessarily raise the immediate cost of committing violence.

The arrival of foreign troops that support the victim group or act as an impartial intermediary force induces an immediate sense of insecurity on the part of the regime because such interventions represent an additional challenge to the regime's domestic hegemony and impede the attainment of desired policy goals. When regimes perceive a threat to their political order they are likely to take steps to assert control, including adopting strategies of extreme violence (Gurr 1986; Valentino 2004). Regardless of the intervener's objective, its entrance complicates the political context, and the regime cannot be immediately sure of its intentions. That is, in the short term it is difficult for a regime to distinguish between an intervening force that wishes to reduce violence and one whose objective is to block the regime from achieving its policy goals. The real motive of the intervener is only likely to be revealed over time.

Posed with the original threat from the victim group and an additional threat from the intervener, the perpetrator's overall threat assessment increases in the short term. The regime is therefore likely to respond by immediately escalating its violence against the victim group. The escalation of violence benefits the regime in several ways. First, regimes have incentives to complete the liquidation before the third party can gain a foothold in the genocide state. By escalating violence against the victim group immediately following the intervener's arrival, the regime is able to refocus its resources toward more capably confronting the additional threat posed by the third party before the intervener is able to support the targeted civilian population. Second, in cases in which outside intervention improves the ability of the victim group to prepare a defense against the regime, an urgent escalation to subdue the target could pay the dividend of avoiding a more powerful, and thus more threatening, victim group in the future. Third, since intervention commonly causes

domestic conflicts to become more internationally public over time, regimes have an incentive to escalate the elimination of their domestic rival before international backlash detrimentally affects the realization of its goals. Finally, an immediate escalation of violence may prompt the intervener's retreat, especially if the intervention itself is targeted or if the intervener believes it has worsened the situation. Strategic perpetrators may escalate violence to indicate their commitment to the genocide and signal to the intervener that any success in intervention will come only at great expense. The intended effect of this signal is to test the third party's resolve, dissuading it from remaining engaged. At the least, an escalation upon the arrival of an impartial or pro-target intervention reflects an effort to achieve a better bargaining position should the perpetrator eventually be compelled to negotiate. This short-term spike in violence was evident in the impartial UN intervention in Bosnia. Fearing that the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) represented a solidification of the territorial status quo, a situation that none of the combatant parties deemed satisfactory, the violence escalated as each side, particularly Serb forces, sought to improve their leverage in any future negotiations (Nation 2003).

The regime's expected cost for genocide is likewise critical to its maintenance of mass killing. While both pro-target and impartial intervention should increase the cost incurred by the regime—by providing aid to those resisting the government, protecting noncombatants, or attracting international attention to the conflict—impartial and pro-target interventions are unlikely to immediately impose enough costs to outweigh the countervailing escalation in threat. The regime is likely to consider the increased cost as temporary, because the regime is likely to doubt the intervener's resolve for bearing the costs of intervention. Intervener resolve is therefore critical to the regime's calculation of maintaining or escalating violence (Posen 1996, 82-84). As a third party's resolve for reducing the violence increases, regime expectations of success should correspondingly decrease, making it more willing to settle the crisis with other means. Conversely, an uncommitted third party should not meaningfully alter the regime's expectations.

However, signaling resolve is difficult. Initially, the regime has reason to question whether impartial and pro-target interveners are willing to bear the cost of involvement. This information is revealed as the intervener either remains committed to altering the status quo. Hence, resolve is largely unknown *ex ante*. Without the ability to credibly signal resolve, the third party cannot reliably increase the regime's expected cost for carrying out violence, nor can it diminish the regime's threat perception, thus making escalation the likely short-term outcome of impartial and pro-victim interventions. NATO's intervention in Kosovo is exemplary. In response to Serbia's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO launched Operation Allied Force (OAF) to compel Belgrade to cease these tactics. Belgrade responded by *expanding* the violence in Kosovo because Milošević perceived that the intervention exacerbated the ethnic Albanian "threat," as the NATO force could threaten Serb control of the province and Milošević's hold on power. The short-term result of the NATO intervention can thus be described as escalating mass killing in the short-term.

Indeed, early criticism of OAF argued that the intervention immediately escalated the conflict into a humanitarian disaster, the outcome NATO had hoped to prevent.

While impartial and pro-target interventions exert a direct effect on regime threat through resistance to the regime's genocidal policy, the relationship between pro-government intervention and violence is more ambiguous. Arguably, interventions that support the regime should bolster its military capabilities. This may diminish its perceived threat. However, the decrease in threat is contingent on the alignment of the intervener's goals with those of the regime. By virtue of its decision to engage in a radical extermination policy, the regime is clearly sensitive to threats to its goals. It is difficult in the short term for any intervener, even those that aid the regime, to unambiguously signal support for the liquidation policies it is pursuing without disturbing the regime's threat perceptions. Like other types, the resolve of a pro-regime intervener is revealed over time as it continues explicit support for the genocide. Therefore, a regime should be sensitive even to pro-perpetrator interventions until it is convinced that the intervener's intentions are closely aligned with its own.¹

While regime suspicion about the long-term goals of an allied intervention may not be sufficient to provoke greater violence, the entry of a supportive intervention effectively reduces the cost of implementing the genocidal policy as any military materiel, intelligence, logistics, or troops that are made available increases the resources that the regime can bring to bear on the victimized population. Therefore, pro-government interventions should decrease the cost of the regime's mass killing policy in the short term, which should in turn increase the level of violence that the regime can perpetrate. We thus posit that in the short-term, pro-perpetrator interventions serve to escalate violence. We are, however, cautious about the strength of this relationship compared to other intervention types, because regimes may be initially uncertain as to the potential threat that pro-regime interveners pose to their genocidal designs since the government cannot be certain of how resolutely such third parties will continue their support after the extent of genocidal policies are revealed.² Therefore, while the regime should see pro-government interventions as less threatening relative to impartial and pro-target interventions, it should be equally wary of the third party's long-term intentions, and additionally its initial costs of conducting mass killing should decrease.

The above discussion produces the following hypothesis regarding the short-term impact of intervention in mass killing:

Hypothesis 1: Third-party intervention will have the short-term effect of escalating the severity of state-sponsored mass killings.

Longer-Term Intervention Effects

Much attention has focused on the frightening efficiency of mass killing in cases like Rwanda. Yet in reality, the majority of mass killings take place over protracted periods, as extermination policies often require lasting commitments to implementation.

For instance, the mass killing of tens of thousands of Salvadoran peasants took place over nearly a decade. Similarly, the Sudanese government's mass killings in the south endured for almost two decades. Indeed, the average length of a mass killing episode in the data analyzed below is 6.3 years. Moreover, violence levels are often not constant but covary with changes in political contexts. Given that genocide usually takes place over a period of years, opportunities exist for third parties to affect the severity of violence upon intervention.

Over time, as information about its intentions are revealed, the intervener gains greater ability to influence the regime's threat perceptions and its expected cost for continued mass violence. If the regime recognizes that an intervener is resolutely devoted to resisting the genocidal policy, is unlikely to withdraw, can raise the cost of continuing violence, and is capable of offering other policy alternatives to the government for addressing the threat from the victim group, the regime becomes increasingly likely to substitute less violent strategies for achieving its goals. However, if regimes observe a high level of resolve from intervening forces that directly challenge its ability to achieve its goals, thereby increasing its threat perception, it is likely to escalate violence. Similarly, a committed intervention that functionally reduces the cost of carrying out violence also contributes to the maintenance of the mass killing strategy. Because of their differential effects on regime perceptions of threat and cost, not all intervention types provide meaningful opportunities for violence reduction. While pro-regime and pro-target interveners can signal resolve as well as impartial interveners, those that support the regime or the target either fail to mitigate the regime's threat or fail to elevate the cost of violence, thus contributing to high violence levels.

Pro-target intervention theoretically increases the costs to the regime for continued mass killings by improving the target's ability to defend itself or by diverting regime resources away from the target and toward the foreign forces. Over time, the presence of a resolute pro-target intervener should steadily increase the cost to the regime for continued atrocities, thus prompting it to consider alternatives. However, as stated above, regimes often turn to mass killing only after exploring and exhausting available alternatives. Pro-target interventions present the regime few options other than continued violence for resolving the threat perceived from the target population. Moreover, this threat perception is likely to increase if the intervener weathers regime attempts to dislodge it and credibly displays its intention of defending the victim (and impeding the regime). By aligning itself with the group that the regime already considered a fundamental impediment to its future well-being, pro-victim interventions increase the regime's threat perception, thus increasing the regime's willingness to use ever more drastic measures in attempting to suppress the hazards to its hegemony.³ Consequently, the longer a target-biased intervention remains committed, the more likely it is that the challenged regime escalates its violence rather than reducing it.

In the case of pro-perpetrator intervention, as support for the regime's genocidal policy continues, any initial threat perceived by the intervener's entry into the conflict should dissipate. However, the threat posed by the target group remains.⁴

Interventions that resolutely support the regime offer few meaningful alternatives to mass killing. Rather, evidenced by their stalwart support for the regime's genocidal designs, pro-perpetrator interventions reinforce the existing mass killing policy by bolstering the military capabilities that the regime can bring to bear on the victims. As such, the regime's choice of a genocidal policy to suppress the threat from the victim group is made significantly less costly. Prior to intervention, the regime had already determined that mass killing was the most productive policy choice for removing the target group threat. Resolute third party support for this policy should reinforce this decision by increasing its cost-effectiveness given the additional tools and manpower dedicated to the liquidation process. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: As the duration of pro-target and pro-government interventions increase, the severity of regime-sponsored killing increases as well.

Compared to the other types, impartial interventions are more likely to address both dimensions necessary for violence reduction. First, given the brutality that characterizes mass killings, mutual trust between the factions is minimal, making resolution difficult. Impartial third parties diminish the need for trust when security guarantees are provided to both perpetrators and victims. Security guarantees offer breathing space to the factions and, when effectively employed, reduce the threat perceived by the regime as it is guaranteed a level of security that previously appeared absent. This may then open opportunities for alternative policy choices that previously seemed inadequate.

Second, impartial interventions can change the perpetrator's expectation of success. Impartial parties can exercise military force by punishing factions that continue to engage in violence, increasing the cost of continued hostilities. For instance, NATO's bombing mission in response to atrocities in Bosnia limited the Serb's ability to extend its violent campaign. Furthermore, impartial forces help counteract retributive violence from the victim group. Violence often leads to reprisals, creating a cycle that is difficult to overcome. By interceding between perpetrator and victim, impartial interveners alter the expectation of a successful genocide at acceptable cost to the perpetrator and provide alternatives for the regime to achieve its goals. In a related manner, using the above noted tools, impartial interveners help create an environment conducive to negotiations. Opportunities for the impartial intervener to act as an unbiased mediator are then available, and the intervener's ability to punish factions that shirk on agreed frameworks help to effectively enforce settlements. Pro-target third parties have fewer such tools, and the prejudicial nature of their involvement make such conflict resolution strategies less effective. For example, neutral interveners in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sudan established safe areas where civilians were afforded armed protection and provided shelter for refugees fleeing violence. While these interventions have faced notable criticism, such tactics have proved successful in saving lives. While UNPROFOR's safe zones in Bosnia were not impervious to violence, the combatants made some efforts to avoid conflict in these regions, seeking

to evade the international scrutiny that attacking these areas could beget. Further, in many cases, UNPROFOR was capable of leading civilians away from violence. Despite the horrific killings in Srebrenica in 1995, the UN forces' withdrawal from the city shepherded away scores of civilians that would likely have otherwise been killed (Nation 2003, 188-90). Thus, even impartial interventions that are commonly criticized for their limitations offer opportunities for reducing violence.

Importantly, unlike the other types, impartial third parties can use these tools to indicate its objection to the genocidal policy option chosen by the genocidaires while not necessarily standing against the perpetrator's ultimate goals. In the Bosnian case, Serbian forces, much maligned internationally for their violent tactics, were afforded significant territorial concessions in line with their goals. Mass killing was the policy *tool* used to achieve the *goal* of territorial control (Valentino 2004). The UN and NATO, through continued involvement, made clear that the tool was objectionable while the goal was negotiable. By interceding between the factions, offering security guarantees, punishing insubordination, and directing negotiations, impartial interveners assist in reducing the threat that perpetrators perceive from the victim group and raise the cost of continued violence. As such, an intervener needs to convince the regime of its impartiality and resolve in desiring to reduce violence.⁵

Establishing these traits does not occur immediately because the perpetrator is unable to assess the intervener's *ex ante* intentions, credibility, or commitment. Interventions that seek to reduce violence may initially be indistinguishable from those that attempt to abet the target. Yet, the longer the intervener remains committed, the more information it reveals about the sincerity of its impartiality. Greater time on the ground benefits impartial interveners because they are more effectively capable of demonstrating their desire to de-escalate the violence as opposed to thwarting regime policy goals or promoting the goals of the target. Thus, the longer the duration of an impartial intervention, the more likely the regime is to revise downward the level of threat it perceives from the intervening force. By this logic, we expect that impartial interventions will diminish the severity of mass killings over the long term, leading to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2b: As the duration of impartial interventions increases, the severity of regime-sponsored killing will decrease.

We now turn to a discussion of our variables. We then present analyses of our expectations.

Variables and Research Design

The dependent variable is measured by the magnitude of the mass killing in each genocide year. As previous analyses note, accurate reports of genocide severity are infrequent as those groups closest to the violence have incentives to exaggerate their accounts. To handle the imprecise nature of such data, the Political Instability Task

Table 1. Ordinal Mass Killing Death Estimates and Descriptive Intervention Statistics

Genocide/politicide magnitude	Genocide/politicide deaths estimate per country-year
0.0	Less than 300
0.5	300–1,000
1.0	1,000–2,000
1.5	2,000–4,000
2.0	4,000–8,000
2.5	8,000–16,000
3.0	16,000–32,000
3.5	32,000–64,000
4.0	64,000–128,000
4.5	128,000–256,000
5.0	256,000+

Intervention type	Number of interventions	Intervention duration range	Mean duration
Impartial	21	1–8 years	2.35 years
Pro-target	26	1–11 years	3.44 years
Pro-government	22	1–14 years	3.91 years

Force (PITF) (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2002) provides an ordinal measure of mass killing magnitude. The top half of Table 1 reports this scale.

The primary independent variables are provided by the IMI data set (Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008), which codes overt military interventions by third parties from 1946 to 2005. A military intervention is defined as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann 1993, 1). This definition is narrow. Yet, focusing on military interventions is useful. Given the high level of instability associated with mass killing, military interventions are likely necessary to considerably affect genocide severity. Three intervention types are coded. Pro-target interventions either support the victim group or confront the regime; pro-government interventions support the regime or attack the victims; and impartial interventions support neither perpetrator nor victim. What distinguishes impartial interventions is that they are not aimed at affecting the conflict’s power balance whereas pro-target and pro-regime interventions clearly are. Instead, impartial interventions serve as an intermediary force. We are therefore careful to avoid coding actions such as building roads and medical relief as “impartial intervention” since these programs are not directly related to the level of the violence. General descriptive statistics for the separate intervention types are reported in the bottom half of Table 1. To account for short- and long-term effects, we create two variables for each intervention type, yielding six variables: *Impartial*

Intervention Short-Term, Impartial Intervention Long-Term, Pro-Target Intervention Short-Term, Pro-Target Intervention Long-Term, Pro-Govt Intervention Short-Term, and Pro-Govt Intervention Long-Term. The short-term variables are coded 1 to represent the first year of intervention in a genocide episode and 0 otherwise. The long-term variables count the consecutive years of intervention in genocide.⁶

Our theory speaks to the temporal commitment of each intervention, but this may not be the only important trait. The strength of the intervention may also be relevant. IMI data offer an ordinal scale of each intervention's troop strength: 0 = no troops; 1 = 1–1,000; 2 = 1,001–5,000; 3 = 5,001–10,000; 4 = 10,000+. We thus produce three variables: *Impartial Troops*, *Pro-Target Troops*, and *Pro-Govt Troops*. Our theory argues for a temporal effect of intervention as an indicator of resolve. The number of troops committed may be a comparable signal. We have similar expectations for these variables: impartial interventions should be the most capable of reducing genocide magnitude as the number of troops increases.

We include several control variables. To account for path dependence—a phenomenon frequently observed in the state repression literature—we include a one-year lag of our dependent variable, *Mass Killing Magnitude*_(t-1) (Davenport 1995; Krain 2005; Poe and Tate 1994). Next, we use a count variable, *Mass Killing Duration*, reflecting the number of genocide years that have passed to account for duration dependence. We expect that as the killing persists, mass killing severity should decrease. We also measure the regime's capacity for killing by accounting for the size of its military to create *Genocidaire Troops*, which uses data from the National Material Capabilities data set (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Regime Type uses Polity IV data to determine whether government type affects genocide magnitude, and we also use Polity's *Executive Constraints* measure of the institutional constraints on the state's executive (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) because simply measuring regime type misses the role of executive power (Aydin and Gates 2008). *Civil War* is a dichotomous variable taken from Gleditsch et al. (2005), which measures whether the genocide state is embroiled in a civil war. Given the threat they pose to the regime, civil wars can provide the impetus for mass killing to eliminate the rebels' support base (Valentino 2004). *Population* measures the genocide state's population size. Larger populations should increase the potential for victim deaths and the recruiting of genocidaires. Development is proxied by *GDP/Capita*. As wealth rises, individuals should be less willing to partake in radical policies. *Population* and *GDP/Capita* are taken from Gleditsch (2002), and both are log transformed. Lastly, *Cold War* is a dichotomous indicator for the geopolitical context. Years prior to 1990 are coded 1; all others are 0.

Results and Analysis

Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we rely on an ordered logit model.⁷ Table 2 reports our findings. We have a large number of intervention variables. Since we risk overspecification, we run several models. Models 1 and 2 are the primary models

Table 2. The Short- and Long-Term Effect of Intervention on Mass Killing Magnitude, 1955–2005

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intervention, Short-Term	0.70 (.25)***	–	–	0.64 (.34)**	–
Impartial Intervention, Short-Term	–	0.85 (.46)**	–	–	1.32 (.85)*
Impartial Intervention, Long-Term	–0.32 (.10)***	–0.33 (.10)***	–	–0.26 (.11)***	–0.21 (.12)**
Pro-Target Intervention, Short-Term	–	0.98 (.42)***	–	–	1.23 (.84)*
Pro-Target Intervention, Long-Term	0.10 (.06)**	0.09 (.06)*	–	–0.09 (.15)	–0.02 (.15)
Pro-Govt Intervention, Short-Term	–	–0.06 (.49)	–	–	–0.20 (.58)
Pro-Govt Intervention, Long-Term	0.11 (.05)**	0.11 (.05)***	–	0.18 (.05)***	0.16 (.06)***
Impartial Troops	–	–	–0.27 (.17)**	–0.22 (.21)	–0.44 (.34)*
Pro-Target Troops	–	–	0.19 (.15)	0.27 (.26)	0.13 (.28)
Pro-Govt Troops	–	–	0.08 (.13)	–0.19 (.18)	–0.11 (.19)
Genocidaire Troops	–	–	0.00 (.00)***	0.00 (.00)***	0.00 (.00)**
Mass Killing Magnitude _(t-1)	0.64 (.16)***	0.65 (.16)***	0.71 (.20)***	0.72 (.19)***	0.75 (.19)***
Mass Killing Duration	–0.09 (.04)***	–0.09 (.04)**	–0.07 (.04)**	–0.08 (.04)**	–0.09 (.04)**
Population (ln)	0.08 (.08)	0.08 (.08)	–0.14 (.07)**	–0.10 (.09)	–0.09 (.09)
GDP/Capita (ln)	–0.56 (.19)***	–0.58 (.20)***	–0.54 (.20)***	–0.64 (.23)***	–0.64 (.22)***
Regime Type	0.03 (.06)	0.03 (.06)	0.005 (.05)	0.01 (.06)	0.03 (.06)
Executive Constraints	–0.09 (.17)	–0.08 (.16)	–0.06 (.17)	–0.04 (.17)	–0.08 (.18)
Civil War	0.94 (.31)***	–0.97 (.30)***	1.43 (.37)***	1.32 (.40)***	1.31 (.40)***
Cold War	–0.84 (.57)*	–0.75 (.57)*	–0.55 (.63)	–0.83 (.66)	–0.88 (.70)
Ancillary Parameters	–	–	–	–	–
Removed for space purposes	–	–	–	–	–
Observations	304	304	272	272	272
Wald X ² (12, 14, 12, 16, 18)	166.66***	197.14***	195.99***	374.37**	393.10***
Log pseudo-likelihood	–622.14	–620.43	–554.93	–548.08	–545.29

Note: Estimated using ordered logit with White robust standard errors and clustering on genocide state.

* Significant at $p < .1$.

** Significant at $p < .05$.

*** Significant at $p < .01$, one-tailed test; robust standard errors in parentheses.

for testing our hypotheses, reporting results for our short- and long-term expectations. We focus mainly on these models. Our theory postulates that there is a general short-term effect of intervention, which is not specific to intervention type. Model 1 generalizes this short-term effect. Model 2 then disaggregates the short-term effect of each intervention type to determine differences between them. Model 3 looks only at troop commitments. Lastly, models 4 and 5 combine the troop commitment variables with the primary intervention variables from models 1 and 2, respectively.⁸

Across models, we find consistent results for several controls. Unsurprisingly, the lagged dependent variable and duration term are statistically significant. *Mass Killing Magnitude*_(*t*-1) has a positive effect. States producing massive violence in year *t* - 1 are likely to do so again in year *t*. *Mass Killing Duration* has the opposite effect. The longer genocide wears on, the more difficult it becomes to cause massive civilian deaths. The coefficient for *GDP/Capita* indicates that destitute states suffer more violent genocides. Given that genocides generally occur in poor states, it is interesting that even among the lower stratum, wealth is a predictor of severity. *Civil War* has a positive effect, as increasing instability provides occasions for scapegoating and eliminating the rebel's civilian support base. While *Population* is insignificant in most models, it is significant in model 3. Yet, the variable indicates that larger populations do not increase opportunities for violence. Additionally, there is some evidence that the cold war had a dampening effect on genocide, but the variable significance of this predictor makes us tentative to draw conclusions. Lastly, the regime type variables appear to have no systematic effect.

Turning to our first hypothesis, our expectation is that intervention, regardless of the side supported, has a short-term effect of increasing mass killing severity. The positive and significant coefficient for *Intervention, Short-Term* in model 1 shows that this generally is the case. The intervention of a third party yields an escalation of violence committed against the victim group. Disaggregating this short-term effect by the type of intervention in model 2, we find that the initial spike in violence is primarily the result of impartial and pro-target interventions that produce positive and significant results, whereas the pro-regime coefficient is insignificant. We interpret these findings as general support for our first hypothesis. Interventions in the short term, particularly those that do not support the government, produce this effect because third parties cannot credibly affect the regime's expected costs of successful genocide and provide means by which to reduce the regime's threat perceptions. Without adequate time to demonstrate commitment, interventions cannot effectively manage the crisis. For one, the resolve of the intervener is critical to the perpetrator's cost calculation, and the regime may test that commitment by immediately escalating the violence, thus posing higher expected costs to the intervener's mission. Escalation is thus a strategic response to intervention. Further, by undertaking a radical policy, the regime has proven its capacity to react drastically to threats. Intervention in the short term is likely to be perceived as an additional threat to the regime's genocidal policy and the goals it is attempting to achieve. Hampered by an inability to demonstrate resolve in the short term, third parties,

especially those intent on resisting the genocidal policy, have difficulty altering the perpetrator's expectations of success. Therefore, the genocidaires reasonably look to escalate their killings in an effort to increase the cost calculi of impartial and pro-target third parties and to complete the policy before an intervention can affect the genocide's conclusion. In contrast, pro-government interventions do not appear to produce a systematic short-term effect, which may be the result of somewhat contradictory elements inherent in pro-regime interventions. This is apparent in the regime's threat perceptions. While the regime is sensitive to the entrance of any third party for reasons we give above, this perceived danger should be significantly less threatening than interventions that explicitly support the target or resist the mass killing policy. Furthermore, while the cost of carrying out the genocide should immediately decline with external support, the regime should be wary of the intervener's resolve in maintaining this support. Further research should therefore aim to determine the circumstances under which pro-regime interventions have various short-term effects on genocide magnitude.

To further explore these results, we generate predicted probabilities to assess the size of the effects for our significant short-term intervention variables. Table 3 presents the probabilities for each ordered category of severity generated from the results in model 2.⁹ In generating these values, we hold all of the continuous controls at their means and dichotomous controls at their modes. The baseline case represented in the second column holds the intervention variables at 0. In other words, no intervention is present. Columns 3 and 4 vary each short-term intervention type from 0 to 1 individually.¹⁰ We note that the mean level of genocide magnitude in the data is approximately 2.5. As the upper half of the table indicates, impartial and pro-target interventions decrease the likelihood of obtaining every category of magnitude up to 2.5, and each order above 2.5 becomes increasingly likely in the short term. In other words, lower levels of mass killing magnitude become less likely immediately upon the intervention of an impartial intervener, and higher ordinal categories of violence become more likely indicating that impartial interveners cause an escalation of violence in the short term. More simply, assume a hypothetical case experiencing mass killing at a 2.5 order of magnitude. The bottom half of the table reports the likelihood that this case will escalate (e.g., the sum of the probabilities for magnitudes 3.0–5.0) without an intervention is approximately .409. The presence of an impartial intervention increases the likelihood of escalation to .534, a 31 percent increase in genocide severity. Similarly, pro-target intervention increases the likelihood of escalation by 61 percent. These results indicate that the short-term effect of impartial and pro-target intervention is to substantially increase genocidal violence.

Turning to our long-term expectations, we find support for Hypothesis 2a. While previous research argues that pro-target interventions may have a dampening effect on violence (Krain 2005), models 1 and 2 show that enduring pro-target intervention increases genocide severity. While pro-target interveners are capable of demonstrating resolve and raising the cost of mass killing to the perpetrators, such interventions do little to ameliorate the regime's perception of threat posed by the victim group.

Table 3. Short-Term Substantive Effects of Intervention Type on Mass Killing Magnitude, 1955–2005 (model 2)

Mass killing magnitude	No interventions	Short-term impartial intervention	Short-term pro-target intervention
0.0	.092	.062	.038
0.5	.072	.050	.032
1.0	.085	.061	.041
1.5	.101	.077	.058
2.0	.093	.078	.060
2.5	.149	.139	.115
3.0	.173	.190	.187
3.5	.162	.218	.281
4.0	.045	.074	.106
4.5	.015	.027	.042
5.0	.014	.025	.041

Effect on magnitude	No interventions	Short-term impartial intervention	Short-term pro-target intervention
Likelihood of decreased magnitude	.443	.328	.229
Likelihood of no change (2.5 mag)	.149	.139	.115
Likelihood of increased magnitude	.409	.534	.657

Note: Columns 3 and 4 change the short-term intervention variables from 0 to 1, representing a change from no intervention to the first year of an intervention's presence in the genocide state. Since the short-term intervention variables only take a value of 1 when their corresponding long-term variables also take a value of 1, we also increase each long-term variable from 0 to 1.

Instead, pro-target third parties exacerbate this threat perception, escalating violence against the victims. Yet, we are somewhat tentative about this result as the pro-target variable becomes insignificant in models 4 and 5.

The negative and significant coefficient for long-term impartial intervention, supports our expectation in Hypothesis 2b, indicating that as an impartial intervention remains devoted to an episode of genocide, hostilities subside. The effect of long-term impartial interventions is further reflected in the upper half of Table 4. Starting from a 2.5 magnitude, the likelihood that mass killing falls to a lower magnitude without an intervention is .443. However, this probability increases as the number of impartial intervention years increases. For example, moving from no years of impartial intervention to 25 percent of its range, the likelihood of de-escalation rises to .605, a 37 percent increase. As the number of impartial intervention years invested moves to its maximum (eight years), the likelihood of de-escalation increases to .901, a substantial increase of 104 percent. Impartial intervention thus has a strong dampening effect on the severity of mass killings over time.¹¹

Table 4. Long-Term Substantive Effects of Intervention Type on Mass Killing, 1955–2005 (Model 2)

Effect on magnitude	No interventions	Long-term impartial intervention (25%)	Long-term impartial intervention (50%)	Long-term impartial intervention (75%)	Long-term impartial intervention (max)
Likelihood of decreased magnitude	.443	.605	.742	.840	.901
Likelihood of no change (2.5 mag)	.149	.133	.098	.065	.042
Likelihood of increased magnitude	.409	.263	.159	.095	.058

Effect on magnitude	No interventions	Long-term pro-govt intervention (25%)	Long-term pro-govt intervention (50%)	Long-term pro-govt intervention (75%)	Long-term pro-govt intervention (max)
Likelihood of decreased magnitude	.443	.353	.273	.209	.160
Likelihood of no change (2.5 mag)	.149	.147	.134	.116	.097
Likelihood of increased magnitude	.409	.501	.593	.676	.743

Note: Column 2 reports identical values to those reported in Table 3: all continuous controls held at their means, all dichotomous controls held at their modes, and all intervention variables held at zero. Columns 3 through 6 change the long-term impartial and long-term pro-government intervention variables from 0 to their values at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%.




Figure 1. For the first year of intervention, both the short- and long-term intervention variables are changed from 0 to 1. In each subsequent year, the short-term intervention variables take a value of 0, and the long-term variables count upward.

Another significant effect is that long-term pro-government intervention increases the likelihood of escalation over time, providing further evidence of Hypothesis 2a. The bottom half of Table 4 reports the predicted increase in the likelihood of escalation as the number of pro-regime intervention years increases. Moving from zero intervention years to the maximum (fourteen years), the likelihood of escalation rises from .409 to .743, an 82 percent increase. A durable pro-government intervention credibly signals that it supports the regime's mass killing policy. Interventions that remain committed to supporting the regime serve to reinforce its expectation of a successful policy by substantially reducing the cost of policy implementation. Through the provision of troops and military materiel, the resources available to the regime for suppressing the victim group rise, allowing the regime to more effectively pursue genocide.¹²

Figure 1 displays our short- and long-term results from model 2 simultaneously. In this graph, the likelihood of escalation is plotted over time for impartial and pro-government interventions. The predicted probabilities of escalation are generated by holding each control variable constant and varying the short- and long-term impartial and pro-government intervention types corresponding to the intervention year. As the graph shows, impartial intervention produces a short-term spike in violence. Yet, consistent with our expectations, the likelihood of escalation decreases dramatically to very low levels in subsequent years as an impartial party remains

committed. While pro-regime intervention does not produce a significant spike in the immediate term, such interventions produce a clearly positive effect on the probability of escalation over time. Figure 1 thus lends visual credence to the exacerbating effect of pro-regime interventions.

The results presented in models 1 and 2 are largely supported by the subsequent models in Table 2. Model 3 displays the effect of troop commitments by the various intervention types and the size of the military at the disposal of the perpetrators. In this model, the result for *Genocidaire Troops* indicates that as the size of the regime's military increases, its ability to commit greater atrocities against the victim group increases. Also, *Impartial Troops* is significant, negatively affecting the violence. This result supports our general argument that impartial interventions dampen violence. While this variable is insignificant in model 4, its significance reappears in model 5 after disaggregating each short-term intervention type. Together models 4 and 5 show that even when accounting for multiple characteristics of intervention, several of the relationships remain intact. Model 4 shows that in general the short-term effect of intervention is to increase violence, and the positive and significant effects of short-term impartial and pro-target interventions carry over to model 5. The level of violence abates as the impartial third party remains committed. Finally, pro-regime interventions that persist in supporting the regime increase hostilities across the final two models.¹³

Discussion and Conclusion

The results presented above provide strong support for our hypotheses. First, we find that intervention has the short-term effect of exacerbating genocidal violence, and this appears to be driven by the impartial and pro-target types. Second, we find support for our hypothesis noting that impartial interventions diminish violence over time. We report also that pro-government intervention worsens hostilities with time. Preliminary results for long-term pro-target interventions also point to an exacerbating effect.

These results are interesting for a variety of reasons. First, they suggest that intervention generally produces an immediate increase in violence, supporting related research on civil war intervention. However, previous research has taken the somewhat generic approach of dichotomizing the presence of an intervener. The analysis of an intervention's presence is treated similarly to the effect of an experimental medical treatment for an illness. It would of course be interesting to know whether a medicine has a positive or negative effect on disease severity. However, dichotomizing intervention is analogically similar to conducting a medicinal treatment without considering important issues like the type of medicine used or the amount of time it remains in a person's system. It is unlikely that third parties consider their involvement as simple dichotomous treatments for genocidal ills. Rather, we find that the temporal investment of interveners is critical to understanding intervention's effect.

The short-term spike in severity is an important finding. Genocidaires view intervention, especially impartial and pro-target types, as inhibiting their policies and undermining their hegemony. Interveners alter the strategic landscape, increasing the threat perception of the perpetrator. In some cases, third parties may embolden opposition groups to launch counteroffensives. In others, they may expose the regime to international scrutiny, economic sanctions, or further interventions. These changes increase the incentives for the regime to escalate the violence to fulfill its policy before the intervention can take effect or to achieve a better bargaining position should the regime eventually be forced to negotiate. Also, by escalating its campaign, the regime tests the resolve of the third party. Interveners that are not truly committed will be scared off as they reconsider their willingness to pay the price of intervention. Policymakers must bear this in mind when making intervention decisions.

Withstanding this initial spike can pay dividends for third parties seeking to lessen the hostilities. We tested whether pro-victim intervention produces a long-term diminution of violence. Yet, this intervention type produced inconsistent results, though likely exacerbating hostilities. We thus question the value of this strategy. However, impartial interveners were found to have a long-term negative effect on violence. These results indicate that impartial third parties provide the mechanisms needed for conflict management. Given time to demonstrate commitment, impartial interveners are able to provide credible security assurances, frameworks for negotiation, unbiased information, and monitoring activities, thereby altering the regime's cost calculus and threat perception. It is unreasonable to expect immediate positive changes in the security environment because these mechanisms only take hold after the resolve of the intervener is established over time. Biased interveners are unlikely to achieve the same legitimacy, which is critical in promoting stability (Ratner 1996). Interventions that challenge the regime are unlikely to mitigate the regime's threat perception. Consequently, the regime will be inclined to continue the conflict to its conclusion, sustaining the bloodshed.

From our findings the policy community should first conclude that interventions be seen as long-term projects if they expect their involvement to reduce atrocities. While acting impartially yields a short-term spike in violence, this spike is corrected thereafter. Indeed, we find that the likelihood of escalation drops substantially from the first to the second year of impartial intervention, more than offsetting the initial increase, and this reduction continues subsequently. Policymakers cannot assume that intervention is a quick fix. Rather, such endeavors only pay dividends in the long run. As a result, when deciding to intervene to halt mass murders, third parties should plan to commit for the long haul or refrain from intervention altogether. This recommendation may appear problematic as few states will be interested in committing troops for long periods and calls for intervention may go unheeded. However, the alternative of short-term intervention worsens an already brutal situation. If interventions are to succeed they must be seen as long-term commitments, not Band-Aid approaches to genocide.

Second, actors interested in stemming the violence should employ impartial strategies. Third parties may be drawn to support the target in an effort to give the victims a fighting chance, but such strategies are ineffective. Impartial interventions are the only long-term tool that moderates violence. To shorten the time that impartial interveners need to stay committed in order to bring stability, it is sensible for interveners to signal resolve as forcefully and credibly as possible from the outset. The earlier the regime recognizes that the intervener is committed to impartial resolution, the sooner the third party can begin to meaningfully influence the factors driving the violence. Toward this end, taking such actions as promoting the unity of the international community, making sizeable troop commitments, and publicly proclaiming the intervention's comprehensive mandate are means of indicating resolve. Given the threat perceptions of genocidal regimes, we also recommend that interveners ensure that their public mandates clearly stipulate goals of conflict resolution that are explicitly nonthreatening to the regime. Doing so will help build the intervener's legitimacy as a peace broker in the eyes of the government. Failure to do so will result in sustained violence rather than resolution.

Authors' Note

The authors' names are listed alphabetically. For their helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Timothy Nordstrom, Megan Shannon, Susan Allen, Mark Crescenzi, Stephen Gent, Mark Souva, Ayeseğül Aydin, David Cunningham, Jasjeet Sekhon, Michael Gilligan, Daniel Hidalgo, Gregory Love, Zack Baumann, and two anonymous reviewers. Stata 10 was used to generate the statistical results presented in this article. The data used in this article are available at jcr.sagepub.com or upon request from kathman@olemiss.edu.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. The Rwandan genocide is an example. French intervention sparked an initial escalation even though the operation initially meant to support the sitting Hutu regime. Yet extremists in the regime perceived that French interests would diverge from the governments if the French learned of the genocidal tactic being used. As a result, the perpetrators escalated their elimination of Tutsis while attempting to keep the atrocities secret. Pro-Hutu intervention was thus perceived as a threat. Consequently, the killings escalated in an attempt to complete the genocide before the intervention could be take effect (Kuperman 2001). Genocidal regimes are aware that their behavior is atrocious to most observers. Thus, even when a third party

commits to aiding the government, the regime's sensitivity to maintaining domestic hegemony causes it to initially perceive even supportive interventions as threatening.

2. Referring again to Rwanda, while French forces initially improved the regime's ability to defend against advancing Tutsi rebels while also engaging in the genocide, knowledge of the atrocities caused French resolve in supporting the regime to plummet. Conversely, Soviet support for mass killing in Afghanistan was provided consistently throughout the 1980s. Resolve was displayed over time in the Soviet case; it was not in the French case. In both cases, this resolve is difficult for the regime to accurately estimate in the short term, as it is only reliably revealed over time.
3. A counterargument is that a highly powerful pro-target intervention can stymie violence by simply ousting the regime. This logic drives the "challenging intervention" model. The limitation of this argument is that pro-target interventions seldom exert the force necessary to depose a sitting regime or impose costs sufficient to outweigh the threat motivating violence. Indeed, most pro-target interventions fail to oust the regime, and few have this intention.
4. This assumption is consistent with the strategic violence literature. The regime continues to use violence until compelled to stop or until the threat has abated.
5. Some may question how a regime can see an intervener as impartial if it is motivated to reduce violence. Recall that mass killing is *not* the regime's goal. It is the chosen means for pursuing its goal. Killing is not valuable for the sake of killing. Mass killing can thus be seen as a class of violence that is not wholly different from other types of intrastate hostilities. For instance, simply because an intervener becomes involved in a civil war to stop the violence does not indicate that the intervener is inherently antiregime or antirebel. Genocides often occur in tandem with civil wars, and the victim group is often represented by the rebels. Interveners can counter violence without favoring any faction. Further, genocidal regimes are at times afforded concessions in conflict resolving agreements in both civil war and mass killing. This would be unacceptable for impartial third parties if they were truly biased. Also, their impartiality does not indicate a lack of force. Like all types, impartial interventions must meet the IMI data set's strict requirements to be considered *military* interventions.
6. Given our theory, we coded each intervention with consideration to intervention type instead of the number of interveners or their individual characteristics. When an intervener withdraws from the genocide for six months, subsequent involvement is considered a new intervention. We adopt the first year delineation for several reasons. First, it is difficult to conceptualize a short-term effect lasting more than a year given the regime's ability to update its expectations. Therefore, we consider one year conservative. As a practical check, we separately included atheoretical dummy variables for intervention years 2 through 5. Only the first year consistently produced significant results across intervention type. Second, we ran models with dummies for every intervention year. This is not an ideal test, as it overspecifies the models. Still, we found that the coefficients for each intervention type changes sign in the expected direction when moving from the first to second year, indicating that the effect of intervention changes after the first year as theorized. Also, to account for the possibility of regimes escalating their violence prior to intervention once a third party has credibly signaled its intention to intervene, we coded

both the first year of intervention and the year prior to intervention as 1 and all else was coded 0. The results were very similar to what is reported in Table 2. Furthermore, using Thyne's (2009) signals data, we directly tested for the effect of cooperative or hostile signals sent by international actors to the regime prior to intervention. However, the signals sent did not seem to have a significant effect on genocide magnitude. Given these checks, we are confident in our variables as they are currently coded.

7. The White estimator of robust standard errors corrects for heteroscedasticity and accounts for the fact that yearly observations are unlikely to be independent within genocide states but are likely to be independent across them.
8. The results reported below were replicated using a dependent variable whose minimum value was 2.5 magnitude in an effort to reflect Valentino's (2004) more restrictive definition of mass killing which requires 50,000 deaths over the course of five years. The results were very similar to those reported in Table 2.
9. The predicted probabilities were generated using Clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001).
10. *Pro-Govt Intervention, Short-Term* is not addressed here given its insignificance.
11. It should be noted that this negative effect of long-term impartial interventions is not a product of any one long intervention. The longest impartial intervention was removed, and the results remained the same.
12. We do not address *Pro-Target Interventions, Long-Term* in Table 4 due to its varying significance across models.
13. We recognize the potential for selection bias in these analyses. If impartial interveners are systematically choosing "easy" cases for which there is a prior expectation that violence will abate, our results may be less valuable. To test for this, we employed the matching technique used by Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) and made available by Sekhon (IN PRESS). Matching methods allow closer examination of causal inferences by pairing observations that experienced the "treatment" (intervention), with similar observations that did not. As such, matching methods correct for selection bias by comparing cases that are closely equivalent on a series of confounding factors such that differences on the dependent variable can be equated to the treatment's effect. Regarding each of our intervention variables as separate treatments, and using each of our controls as confounders on which to create matched data, we generated a series of matched data sets with 1, 2, 3, and 4 matched observations per each treatment observation given the various suggestions on what number of matches is appropriate (see Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Abadie et al. 2004; Abadie and Imbens 2002). With these matched data sets, we reconsidered our ordered logit models and found very robust results reflecting those reported in Table 2. The only notable difference in our matching analyses was that *Impartial, Short-Term* was not routinely significant, although its coefficient sign was always in the expected direction. Additionally, we ran a Heckman model for impartial interventions. The first stage predicted the onset of impartial intervention using variables to account for several selection mechanisms: the timing of intervention, potential for "piggybacking" on other intervention types, and level of difficulty inherent in various genocide characteristics. The second stage sought to determine the effect of the short- and long-term impartial

intervention variables along with the controls. However, the selection parameter was insignificant, indicating that impartial interveners were not systematically selecting easy or hard cases. Still, it is worth noting that the long-term impartial intervention variable was negative and significant in the second stage.

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